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Summary
     Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) are shaping up as the next step  to 
provide information and safety services to vehicles. These networks are characterized 
for being variable in terms of connectivity and delay due to continuous changes in the 
topology.  These  conditions  are  acceptable  for  developing  best  effort  information 
systems, no bounded in delay or rate.  However,  when dealing with critical  safety 
applications, as emergency accident reports, some improvements are needed in terms 
of  reliability  and  security.  In  this  thesis,  we  present  and  classify  the  incoming 
VANETs  services  and  the  techniques  to  enable  nodes  to  trust  their  neighbours' 
announcements in an efficient and secure manner.  To overcome the limitations, we 
propose  a  reputation-aware  system  for  VANETs  based  on  digital  credentials 
conveying the reputation value assigned to users.  Finally we evaluate the costs and 
accuracy of this new proposal by itself and combined with the existing ones based on 
revocation lists. 
      Keywords: VANETs, certificates,  credentials, reputation, trust.
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1 Introduction
Vehicular  Ad-Hoc  Networks  (VANETs)  constitute  a  promising  technology 
emerged from the application of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) techniques to 
the interactions among vehicles equipped with a new generation of communication 
devices. It is aimed to deliver a vast range of services: from comfort applications,  
such as traffic information, automatic toll payment or even plain Internet, to safety 
functiox nalities as driving assistance or crash notifications by means of a dynamic 
and self organized network where the vehicles themselves form the infrastructure and 
sense their medium to collect information to be shared. We will go in detail through 
all of the possible services in the background section.
Proven the growing pace of VANETs,  regulatory bodies and projects have  been 
established  to introduce some standardization and coordination: C2C-CC (Car2Car 
Communication Consortium)[2]: It is a non-profit organization launched by vehicle 
manufacturers  in  Europe  in  2004.  It  proposes  realistic  deployment  strategies  and 
business  models  to  speed  up  market  penetration.  Some  remarkable  projects  are: 
PreVENT, FleetNet/NOW and SeVeCom.  In USA, Vehicle Safety Communication 
Consortium (VSC) and  IntelliDriveSM (formerly known as Vehicle Infrastructure 
Integration) are major initiatives for establishing the use of common frequency band 
to get “communications to deliver timely information to save lives, reduce congestion 
and improve the quality of life” [3].  Advanced Safety Vehicle (ASV) and Advanced 
Highway Systems (AHS) constitute the Japanese approach, where public sector builds 
the basic services for information and safety and supports the deployment of a vast 
fixed and on-board Ad-Hoc network infrastructure. The technology used is the 5.9 
GHz Dedicated Short Wave Communications (DSRC) and, at least, the ASV project, 
is aimed to be compatible with  C2CC. 
The aforementioned radio technologies are mainly based on an amendment to the 
IEEE  802.11  standard:  the  802.11p.  It  contains  some  enhancements  to  support 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), data exchange between high-speed vehicles 
and between them and the roadside infrastructure in the licensed ITS band of 5.9 GHz
Despite  its  particularities,  VANETs,  as  any  other  networks,  need  appropriate 
routing protocols to deliver the information. Due to the common roots they have in 
wireless sensor networks with MANETs [4], they inherit some of the flavours of the 
routing  techniques  with  some  modifications.  Ad-hoc  networks  routing  normally 
disseminates  information. Whereas,  considering  that  VANETs  are  aimed  to  have 
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infrastructure support, some hierarchy and addressing is present. This is not the object 
of this work, but enough to be said that cars are particularly suitable for Location 
Based  Services  (LBS),  so  routing  protocols  can  leverage  the  availability  of  GPS 
positioning systems, which in terms of routing facilitates directing information to the 
physical areas where the destination is more likely to be.
We need consider the drawbacks and the advantages of vehicular networks: in one 
hand, despite its movement is constrained by roads and others physical elements,it 
still  depends on the social behaviour (sometimes difficult to be modeled). Besides, 
there are negative radio propagation effects due to buildings and other obstacles, so 
network  stability  is  an  important  issue.  Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  to 
remind that,  if successfully deployed, VANETs can provide a potential number of 
millions  of   long  battery  distributed  nodes  almost  anywhere  near  persons.  This 
conditions lead us to consider an added value on this technology, which will not only 
provide driving safety, but also will increase the number of access points to Internet,  
with all the services associated. This way, in a near future, VANETs, mesh networks, 
WiFi  hotspots,  WiMax  and  cellular  networks  would  work  together  to  provide 
continuous  and  seamless  connectivity.  It  is  an  exciting  future  than  worth  to  be 
researched.
In  such a distributed network as VANETs propose, nodes need to be collaborative, 
but then security becomes critical. A user will only choose to share their resources 
(connectivity, information, computation power) if encouraged with a decent level of 
security, that is: if  there is 'trust'. Nobody will take the risk of collaborating without  
some guarantees. This security can be achieved by efficient authentication methods 
and elaborated trust reputation systems. In this work we will focus on the state of 
reputation techniques in the area of  VANETs and will propose some improvements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The Background section gets 
some  insight  in  the  state  of  the  art  of  VANETs  services  and  the  application  of 
reputation to improve their performance,  then continues the Contribution section with 
a proposal for improving the accuracy of the reputation, based on the use of new 
certified entities:  the Reputation Certificates.  The Evaluation section compares the 
existing  techniques  with  our  proposal  and  its  followed  by  a  Conclusion  section 
presenting some assessments and open issues.
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2 Background
In this  section, we first  will  gain some insight into the different services to be 
deployed by VANETs, once this technology is fully implemented. We will review the 
physical requirements needed. One of the most important aspects is security, which 
can  be  accomplished  by  using  reputation  systems.  We  will  show  that,  as  the 
interactions among users in VANETs are sporadic an irregular, a careful design is 
mandatory. Distributed reputation approaches are difficult  to implement and some 
kind of centralization should exists.
2.1 VANETs services
Inter-vehicle communication can provide a vast range of services that will cover all  
applications already provided by devices such smart phones or laptops plus all those 
related  with  driving  safety.  Depending  on  the  authors,  there  are  different 
classifications.  A  common  one  is  based  on  their  criticality,  beside  its  character 
periodic or event-triggered Table 1.
Table 1. Examples of VANETs services
Comfort applications Safety applications
Event driven Periodic
Traffic info. systems Obstacle detection Time-stamp messages
Weather information Hazardous road conditions Vehicle parameters beacons
LBS Post crash emergency call Road signal information
Internet access Emergency Brake Warning – EBW [5] Parking information [6]
Toll payments Intersection Collision Warn. -  ICW[5] Opportunistic routing
• Comfort  applications:  Intended  to  provide  information  about  weather 
conditions, traffic congestion, parking alerts and so on. We can find an inter-vehicle, 
group communication or a communication to a central database, where distant and/or 
disjoint information can become meaningful. Characterized for having a very wide 
broadcast area and loose authentication constraints, which could be provided at the 
application layer (e.g.: SSL connections for Internet access).
• Safety applications: They have priority over comfort applications. Related to the 
detection of hazards on the roads and sending advises locally to other drivers. Include 
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sudden braking of cars ahead, slippery pavement, reduced visibility or  obstacles on 
the road . We take for granted that vehicles can detect those dangers and/or measure 
the  related  variables  by  themselves  in  the  very  near  area.  Nonetheless,  receiving 
security advertisements from neighbours increases safety dramatically.
Safety services  are much more demanding in terms of  security (authentication, 
trust) and time delay. They are triggered by events and certain actions must be taken 
on response to avoid a risk to be materialized under very strict delay conditions.
Security announcements commonly warn about local hazards, so the transmission 
area  is  close  to  the  point  where  the  event  happens and  broadcast  transmission  is 
normally used. A clear example is the security announcement service.Table 2 shows a 
summary of the physical and security network requirements according to the state of 
art solutions  for three typical safety-related services.
Table 2. Typical parameters for VANETs services
Broadcast area Packet 
size
Nodes Delay Retransmission Authentication
EBW 300m1 500B 10 <500ms2 No Important
ICW3 < 100m 500B 10 <360ms4 Yes Important
Time-
stamp
< 100m 500B < 4 <300ms5 Yes Recommended
In the present thesis, we focus on the Emergency Brake Warning (EBW) service as 
we believe it is representative of critical security announcements and requires the use 
of reputation and decision techniques. Besides, due to the  characteristics, it allows 
longer users interaction that for instance 'obstacle detection'. This is important when 
reusing some credentials to make the subsequent interactions faster. 
Our  aim  is  to  evaluate  the  current  techniques  which  try  to   assure  that  these 
services are delivered securely. There are various proposals, but is quite commonly 
accepted that there should be a centralized Trusted Authority (TA) that gathers data 
from the  cars  population  to  create  the  individuals  reputations  and  also  enables  a 
distributed deliver that reputation. This is based on credentials and certificates that 
can be interchanged among the actors without a continuous intervention of the TA.
1 300m according to [15]
2 GPS position time generated in 200 ms. Average human reaction 700 ms
3  Services  defined  in  [5].  According  to  it  the  urban  scenario  is  the  worst  in  terms  of 
demanding faster response and more congested communication medium
4 The maximum delay is calculated from a typical urban crossroad, one user approaching at the 
maximum allowed speed (50km/h). This is derived from the maximum broadcast area which 
is determined by modulation and for a sure delivery of the packet.
5 According to DSRC
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2.2 Reputation Systems
Building trust relations is a key part of today's distributed systems. They increase  
the efficiency without having to improve the detection or actuator parts whereas they 
are critical to avoid bad behaved users to stay in the system with impunity. 
There is an extensive literature on those systems but for our scope we will focus on 
the hybrid-decentralized reputation ones. This is due to the fact that VANETs systems 
need reputation regarding inter-vehicles  relationships  (which can  be  reported to  a 
coordinator) and also because wireless systems make impossible to request others' 
reputation for all and each announcement.
Some proposals as VARS [7] recommend to use a system not dependent on a a 
Trusted  Third  Party  (TTP)  to  manage  the  reputation,  as  most  of  the  VANETs 
networks  are  highly  heterogeneous  and  experience  connection  variability.  In  this 
suites, an  opinion based on the experience is appended to the message as it is locally  
forwarding by the vehicles. We believe that, despite some promising results, it adds 
excessive complexity to the system and assumes poor connectivity which in the near 
future will be overcome.
Regarding the hybrid reputation management systems, here we cover the role of 
the TTP as a Certification Authority (CA) that delivers not just Digital Certificates 
but  also,  as  a  novelty,  another  kind  of  certificates  containing  information  about 
reputation. We envision a trust scheme in which nodes inform about others behaviour 
to a TA which builds up a scoring database with the nodes' ranks. With these data, 
two  kinds  of  certificates  are  made:  the  classical  Identity  Certificates(IC)  and  a 
reputation  certificate  based  on  credentials.  This  latter  is  based  on  the  existing 
Attribute Certificates, containing in their extension field a value that represents the 
reputation of the emitter node. This way, the node can show a certificate to validate 
himself for being trusted in front of others and regarding a certain service.
Both kind of certificates will be updated when necessary or revoked (explicitly or 
not renewed) when the user reaches some degree of bad behaviour. Also a node can 
be expelled from the network or banned from some services due to various reasons: 
Inefficient or harmful use of network resource; exceeding of bandwidth usage; not 
relaying other nodes information; false announcements or no proper collaboration in 
routing tasks. We will detail this approach later on.
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2.3 Certificate verification
As is stated in the survey [3], the announcements from a group of vehicles and 
more generally any VANETs security service needs some kind of authentication to 
avoid that malicious nodes to impersonate members of the group and send fake or 
incomplete information (road sliding status, presence of an accident and so on).
This authentication can be achieved by means of Digital Certificates. For wired 
communications, these certificates are normally interchanged at the beginning of a 
secure communication as a prove of authenticity,  enabling to interchange securely 
information by Public Cryptography techniques and setting further session keys.
However in  VANETs the scenario is  a  little  different.  We do not  pursue  long 
secure  communications  but  short  authenticated  announcements.  Cars  are  moving 
constantly and their interactions will be quick, in terms of seconds or minutes at most.
So a first approach is to append a certificate to every single message, which in turn  
is signed with the correspondent private key (pair of the public one contained in the 
certificated). Providing the CA's public key is publicly recognized, the receiver can 
verify the authenticity of the certificate and. as a consequence, the authenticity and 
integrity of the message. 
Despite recognizing the authenticity of the CA's public key we need to know if, 
since the certificate was issued, the CA is still recognizing it as valid. This will lead to  
a constant verification of certificates/signatures, one for each message broadcasted. 
Considering that services as the time-stamp need a periodicity of 300ms [8] and the 
usual vehicles densities in big cities, we see that the typical certificate verification 
techniques  will  require  some  modifications  to  cope  with  this  huge  amount  of 
verifications.
A feasible solution is the collaboration of near elements: Road Side Units (RSU) or 
even some designated cars.  Therefore we need efficient protocols capable also to 
work with non reliable elements, as they are more numerous,cheaper and closer to a 
random user. 
To accomplish the verification we have two approaches:  We can use advanced 
certificate  status  validation techniques as the one presented in  [9]  to compare the 
certificate to a trusted list of annulled certificates. Users receive the announcement 
with the Certificate attached and before processing it, they query about its state by 
asking to a close node (which has a fresh list of the revoked certificates). Instead of  
downloading  the  whole  list,  just  certain  parts  of  a  previously  built  hash  tree  are 
transferred to verify the certificate's status regarding the reputation, which speeds up 
the process. If the certificate is valid, then the node that receives the announcement 
can proceed to check the message's integrity and authenticity. For this approach to be 
efficient,  we need some nodes in the vicinity that  could acting as repositories,  an 
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appropriate Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) to be aware of them and some grade of 
connectivity to make possible to download the lists to certain nodes 
Other  methods  of  authentication  change  the  paradigm  and  use  the  batch 
verification  of  signatures.  As  in  VANETs  announcements  there  is  a  broadcast 
common space  under an RSU coverage area   where all  the vehicles  are transmit  
messages,  it  makes  sense  that  sets  of  signatures  can  be  verified  altogether.  One 
interesting approach that offers this service is SPECS [10], which is  a very complete 
suite providing signature verification by interchanging secrets between OBUs, RSUs 
and  TA  and  making  use  Bilinear  Pairings  for  the  cryptographic  operations.  The 
advantage is its robustness and a quite bounded delay, whereas its main drawback is 
its  complexity  and  the  continuous  interchange  of  information  among  the  three 
aforementioned elements.
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3 Our contribution:  Service  reputation by 
digital credentials
So  far,  we  have  a  view of  the  existing  techniques  for  adding  security  to  the 
announcements in VANETs and we know that  is worth to have an hybrid system 
where the TA holds and delivers the reputation. Now our aim is to extend the concept 
of reputation. Not just having a 'accepted or not' decision, but a gradual reputation, 
with  different  levels,  able  to  trigger  diverse  reactions  in  the  objective  node.  We 
believe that a partly centralized system provides several advantages:
• Better  approximation of  users behaviour.  As it  receives  feeds from different 
users interacting to the target in different locations and circumstances, it will be able 
to weight them accordingly. E.g.: A system can decide to rely more in the reports of  
vehicles with newer sensors and less in other whose sensor reports malfunctioning.
• Flexibility. The deliverance of certificates containing reputation can be achieved 
through the same infrastructure used for  the identity  certificates.  Only the reports 
about  other  users  behaviour  will  need  to  be  planned,  but,  as  it  is  not  timely 
constrained,  it  is  not  an  issue.  In  addition,  any  improvement  in  the  reputation 
calculation algorithm can be done seamlessly as it all resides in the TA, not in the 
nodes themselves.
• Reliability.  So  far,  completely  distributed  system  have  been  proved  to  be 
excessively prone to be attacked. A group of malicious nodes could manage to create 
false  reputations  leading  to  critically  dangerous  situations  in  safety  driving 
applications. 
• It  results  more  accurate  and  also  easier  to  control.  Bearing  in  mind  that  
sometimes in the driving environment, a low reputation may imply legal implications 
as  well.  So,  in  case  of  serious  offences,  the  legal  authority  could ask the  TA to 
disclose the reputation and location history of certain drivers.
We will see some of the expected characteristics of the system we propose from its 
general architecture, the gradual responses that the users can show to different levels 
of services reputation and finally to the security entity that can help in delivering the 
reputation in an efficient manner.
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3.1 System's overview
As we mentioned in the introduction, our system will be based on an enhancement  
of the Wi-Fi protocol for vehicles inter communication: the 802.11p. When dealing 
with  security  announcements,  the  nodes  (vehicles)  interchange  short  messages 
regarding  different  events  in  their  vicinity  and  also  communicate  to  central 
management elements to verify the authenticity of others information or to request 
certificates to enable them to send secure messages.
As all the aforementioned certificates must be issued by a TA which also has to 
receive the reports from the vehicles, a clustering architecture is a good option. There  
will be not just a TA but a central one and several local TAs all linked by secure and 
high speed connections forming a clustered configuration Figure 1.
A set of cells, controlled by a Wi-Fi Access Point, also known as Road Side Unit  
(RSU), will  be deployed depending on the vehicles population, most of  the times 
reusing  existing  cellular  base  stations  of  municipality  hotspots.  All  the  security 
sensitive processes will take place either on the nodes or in the trusted elements (TA), 
therefore  the  RSUs  can  be  built  over  no  so-reliable  elements,  making  a  fast  
deployment easier. The RSU can connect to the TA by a point to point connection 
over a plain HDSL line which nowadays can provide quite realistic symmetric rates 
of 1Mbps at a low cost.
All of the TAs are entrusted to sign the certificates and will receive encrypted lists 
about the local vehicles which certificates have to be issued. They will also receive  
reports from the vehicles under their domain and will aggregate that values to save 
bandwidth on the path to the root TA.
In  Figure  2 we can  see  a  summary  of  the  overall  system structure  with  some 
elements  as  the  reputation  certificates  that  will  be  explained  in  the  immediate 
sections.
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Figure 1. Clustered TAs configuration
Figure 2. System architecture
3.2 Service's granularity
To complement the global reputation and leverage the vehicle's sensing capabilities 
we define an architecture that decides on the basis on a combination of both local and 
global reputations. 
Services can be announced with different grades of certainty, proportional to the 
user  reputation,  so  the  response  to  them can  be  modulated,  taking  more  or  less 
expeditious actions. This way, the decision module has more flexibility and even the 
less trustful data, can be use for even small adjust, so the efficiency increases. As we 
see  in  the  Figure  4,  upon the  reception  of  an  announcement,  the  a  local  trust  is 
combined with the global reputation and is processed by a decision module which 
produces an appropriated response to the announcement. These three elements are in 
a trust framework or context, which means that, depending on the node conditions, 
local or global trust could be modulated. 
As an example, the local information comprised by the data collected by sensors as 
proximity radars, could be explicitly modified by the context in the form of a driver  
input.  A proximity warning system will  combine information from the reputation, 
contained in the own announcement, and also from the car's proximity radar (local 
information).
Table 3. Actions delivered according to announcement trust
Trust range: 0 – 0.3 Trust range: 0.3 – 0.6 Trust range: 0.6 - 1
Obstacle 
proximity
(EBW,ICW)
Dashboard 'caution' light Indicator light and sound plus data 
(approach direction, speed)
Brakes and air-bag and other 
securities ready to be activated 
All indications plus 
automatic assisted 
brake activation
Hazardous 
weather 
General hazard indication 
to the user. 
Warning detailed information is 
shown to the user with suggestions 
about the actions to take.
Warning plus 
automatic actions 
(brake activation..)
Post Crash 
call
Receiver verifies  in 
emergency center
User is notified about the emergency 
and related data
User notified  plus 
related data
Time-stamp Plain gps position Position, speed Position, speed and 
added services
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3.3 Reputation information delivery
As we have seen, the bandwidth associated with the data interchanged to verify the 
certificates can be bounded, providing we have enough RSUs scattered throughout the 
roads. However, we have to distribute the information regarding the users reputation 
in a manner that the individuals information stays updated but the whole system is not 
excessively overloaded. This part of the architecture has to be designed carefully as, 
the  inter-vehicle  radio  interface  is  hard  to  model  and  suffers  from  unexpected 
phenomena, being difficult to guarantee a minimum data rate. 
We  have  two  information  units  that  need  to  be  transferred  to  articulate  the 
reputation's deliverance:
• Certificates' Revocation Lists (CRL): They are big files containing information 
from nodes expelled from the system either  because they are not  enabled to  stay 
inside (identity  revoked) or  because their  behaviour has led them to an forbidden 
situation (reputation  revoked).  These  lists  of  nodes  are periodically  transferred  to 
repository nodes, used to quickly check the status of the certificates. They maintain a 
'yes or no' information, so their reputation information is limited but their distribution 
is  easy.  Different  techniques allow to  check  those  lists  remotely  and in  a  secure 
manner, with no need to download all their elements [9].
• Credentials: They bear more accurate reputation information (e.g.: real number 
from 0 to  1).  However,  as  there  is  one  for  each OBU, an  uncontrolled massive 
distribution could easily make the system collapse. It provides detailed information 
but needs a planned distribution. At the end of this section we will depict how this 
credentials can be implemented with a entity based on the Attribute Certificates.
An additional property of the certificates can be exploited: the validity period so 
we  can  set  two strategies:  Certificates  with  a  fixed  and  long validity  period  and 
Certificates  with  short  and  variable  validity  periods.In  the  first  approach,  the 
certificates are delivered in periods of time when the network's activity is low, let's 
say during early mornings (from 0h to 6h).
The second approach tries to adapt the certificates life time to the forthcoming 
user's behaviour. That is, if a user is stable in its actions, normally a certificate will be 
longer  as  is  more  likely  that  reflects  its  actual  situation,  without  needing  to  be 
renewed.  However,  if  a  users  changes  its  behaviour,  more  frequent,  shorter  life 
certificates will better reflect its state. The announcement producer knows that no 
service is valid with outdated certificates, so it will wait for the newly used one to  
broadcast its services. Therefore, the TA will change the validity period according to 
reputation changing pace. 
Validity period (t+Δ)=(α· d (Reputation)
dt
)
−1
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This  approximation  follows  a  plausible  supposition  that  most  of  the  users 
reputation  will  follow  a  smooth  changes.  So  most  of  the  users  will  have  their 
certificates  reissued  and  delivered  in  widely  spaced  periods,  not  overloading  the 
system. Only those whose reputation rises or falls sharply will have more frequent 
deliveries. Additionally, if the system detects that the number of certificates delivered 
is very high, it start discarding the renewal of those falling fast, so the cars that are  
behaving continuously bad, can experience periods of no service, while there is room 
in the system to receive their certificate, this is known as false positive, a 'lesser evil'. 
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3.4 Decision module
 When  a  car  receives  a  security  announcement  from a  nearby  vehicle,  before 
making a decision any action, it  checks both certificates:  the certificate related to  
identity, to be sure she is a legitimate user, and then the reputation one to check if we  
can  trust  her  service.  These  certificates  can  be  verified  against  the  TTP  by 
communicating to it and checking their status or also they can be trusted straight away 
through short life certificates that need to be renewed frequently. We will study both 
approaches for different services and environments
To introduce more flexibility to the system's decision module, we consider not only 
the  different  levels  of  reputation  that  can  be  provided  by  the  information  in  a 
certificate, but also we see different levels of response to the announcement by the 
receiver node, that is a service granularity Figure 3.
In this way, the receiver can match an announcement with rank, combined to local 
observations and a context with the proper level of service. E.g.: When receiving an 
announcement about 'very slippery road 1 mile ahead', the system reads a reputation 
rank of 0.65 out of 1. According to Table 2 we are in the trust level 3. However let's 
assume that we have on-board sensors that work correctly and produce a result of 
'slightly wet road'. With this and other data, the decision module would consider the  
announcement  in  the  trust  band  2  and  apply  the  action  according  to  this  less 
trustworthy  state:  “Warning  detailed  information  is  shown  to  the  user  with 
suggestions about the actions to take”
16
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Figure 3. Decision module in the OBU
3.5 The Reputation Certificate
As we have reviewed, in the state of the art, nodes can check others announcement  
and verify their validity. This way, the TA qualifies the nodes as revoked or non-
revoked  after  gathering  the  opinions  and  building  a  binary  state  from  a  certain 
reputation model. However, this binary status strategy is not flexible and makes hard 
to  accommodate  a  big  range  of  services  to  the  security  paradigm  There  are 
complementary sources to build more accurate reputation as chain  of trust  among 
local  nodes  or  polling  systems  that  collect  opinion  in  the  surroundings  [11]. 
Nevertheless, VANETs are characterized by sporadic and short interactions among 
users,  sometimes  too  few  to  build  autonomous  reputation  ranks  with  enough 
reliability.
We  envision  a  hybrid  system  that  listens  the  reports,  builds  individual  user's 
reputation and delivers it in the form of certificates. These certificates will afterward 
be delivered among users, being this the 'distributed' part of the approach. A common 
system for all  the vehicles,  if  properly designed in terms of security services and 
having an adequate network dimensioning, would have a much better resilience.
Following the aforementioned requirements, we introduce a scheme for providing 
each  user  with  a  reputation  mark  that  qualifies  the  services  it  offers.  To  avoid  
malicious users to forge about this mark, it has to be bound to their identity and to the 
own message. As a consequence an announcement will not be valid without it.
So the entity that  fulfills  the enumerated requirements is  the commonly known 
digital certificate,  now adapted to be used with reputation. Each messages will be 
identity  certified  by  the  known  IC  and  also  reputation  will  be  certified  by  a 
Reputation Certificate (RC) linked to the IC. This new element is issued and signed 
by the TA. Whereas  IC binds a user  identity  to  its  it   public key and backs this  
information with the CA signature, the  RC is an attribute certificate type that binds 
the user current rank with the user identifier provided in the IC.
Based on the standard structure of an attribute defined in [13],  RC will look as 
seen in  Figure 4. It follows the scheme of an Attribute certificate but adding a new 
kind of extension with one byte, expressing a reputation mark going from 0 to 1.
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Figure 4. Reputation Certificate ASN.1 notation
4 Evaluation
Now we will compare the different scenarios for delivering trustworthy reputation 
to VANETs, based on the newly introduced RC combined with the existing certificate 
status validation techniques.
We will evaluate the differences in computational cost due to the cryptographic 
operations in the OBUs, the cost of bandwidth either in sort distance communications 
vehicles-RSU and in the fixed links from TA to the OBUs and finally some comments 
on how accurate each of the systems are.
For establishing a framework of study, we assume a system already using IC, with 
a trusted CA/TA whose IC is known and accepted by all the users. Users keep an IC 
with a long validity period, let's say years, which only has to be reissued when it 
expires or in case of a serious offence.  
Nonetheless,  when  the  cost  of  issuing  and  distributing  the  ICs  is  considered 
negligible  (as  the  probability  that  lots  of  drivers  have  their  identity  revoked 
simultaneously is low and even in that rare event) its distribution could be properly 
scheduled for not to overload the system.
We also consider  that  the IC revocation status  validation is accomplished by  a 
batch-type signature verification  following the SPECS suite [10]. Therefore its cost 
in terms of delay, operations and bandwidth is known and bounded as we will refer 
when required.
For our study we consider a  cars population of 900,000 cars, 10 % of the cars  
having their RC revoked and 50 % per cent of cars in movement in a rush hour. The 
RC size  can  be  roughly  approached  by  1kB.  We also  consider  that  the  TA  can 
compute overall parameters as the average reputation value RepAVG and the overall 
reputation loss  rate  LossAVG.  The values  will  be  used  in  these  and the  other  two 
schemes to have a value of the system total accuracy. 
As the cars interact, they offer and receive services (announcements) among them. 
At the completion of each announcement, the receiver can compare the parameters 
the emitter set in the announcement with those variables sensed by its own sensor in it 
vicinity. According to it, the service can be 'ranked' and its result be reported towards 
the TA.
The reporting messages are not covered in these work but is worth to mention that  
they have to be signed to verify their authenticity and avoid attacks by faking reports 
and also that they should be spaced in time for not to saturate the system. A good 
option  would  be  to  store  locally  and  report  groups  of  them  with  the  initial 
authentication messages that are interchanged upon the arrival of a new OBU to an 
RSU coverage area.
20
4.1 Long life RCs and certificate status validation
In this scenario, in one hand we have the verification mechanism which gives the 
user  a  'revoked/no-revoked'  information  after  consultation.  This  is  just  an 
approximation to the reputation value  so the receiver OBU just knows whether the 
certificate  is valid  or  not.  The  advantage  of  this  approximation  is  its  speed  and 
effectiveness,  as  it  is  implemented  by  batch  signatures  verification  or  checking 
revocation lists. The system, whose revocation lists are stored in the RSU, can be 
renewed more frequently than delivering individual certificates.
Besides the coarse certificate status validation, we have the fine approximation to 
the reputation value: the RCs,  which are delivered  individually   to each user who, 
later on, will attach to its announcement .
Regarding  the  BW used in  the  fixed links from the  TA to  the  RSUs,  we can 
observe from Figure 5 the contribution from the deliverance of both revocation list 
(RCRL)  and  the  Reputation  Certificates  (RC).  For  comparison  to  the  the  other 
schemes, we can say that the BWTA  RSU →  is in the range from 400Kbps to 900Kbps.
To calculate the bandwidth inside the cell, we have three elements: the BW for 
delivering the RC and reporting other user's behaviours,  the BW for downloading the 
revocation  lists  and  BW  for  interchanging  message  plus  certificates  in  the  own 
announcements. 
The RCs can be delivered once a day, during the hours or low activity (let's say  
from 0h to 6h) and, if properly scheduled, it will have little impact on the local BW. 
Also the reports can be scheduled, they do not need to be continuous and can be 
grouped, reporting lots of informs in just one transactions, so we do not consider them 
noticeable.
For the rest of the elements, we consider an RSU cell of 300 m containing 300 
cars.  On average,  we consider  that  one car  produces 4 announcement per second, 
being each announcement approximately 2kB message's body plus IC and RC). In an 
urban  or  semi-urban  area  the  announcements  are  referred  to  events  happening  in 
user's vicinity and also aimed to users nearby. We can use this fact to avoid an storm 
of  announcements  that  would be unbearable for  the  DSRC standard  [15]  by sub-
dividing the cell in emission parts.  This can  be easily achievable by limiting the  
emission power when sending local  announcements  but  using higher power when 
transmitting towards the RSU. So if we divide a 300 m diameter cell in 8 parts , as we 
we get a BW of 2,2 Mbps.
For computing the BW for the reputation certificate status validation checking we 
use  the  method  stated  in  [9]  which  allow  us  to  use  repositories  to  deliver  the 
revocation  status  even  more  locally  (just  in  a  femtocell  of  70  meters  around the 
repository  cars).  The  cost  of  this  local  information  if  we consider  35  cars  in  70 
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diameter  femtocell,  4  requests  per  second  and  the  length  of  the  verification 
information  for  [9],  we  get  a  BW of  1,4Mbps.  Therefore  the  total  bandwidth  is 
Bw
cell_RC 4Mbps. Regarding the Time/cpu cost due to cryptographic operations, to≃  
get some insight into the cost that the security mechanisms add to the system, we 
inspect the different steps from the arrival of the signed announcement until it arrives 
to  the  decision  module (or  is  discarded)  Figure 7.  In  the  Table  4 we can  see  an 
approximation to the processing times in a state of the art equipment based on the 
study of  [14].  We consider  the  cars'  equipment  is  more powerful  that  the one in 
MANETs/WSN, approximately like a desktop  PC.
Regarding  the  system's  fidelity  to  reputation,  if  LossAVG·Tr>  RepAVG there  is 
'impunity period' for some nodes (but Tr is considered fixed in this scenario) Figure 6
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Figure 5. BW from TA to RSU
Table 4. Time cost for  cryptographic operation. RC and certificate status validation
Security operation Description Time(ms)
IC  revocation  status  checking  and 
signature verification
SPECS  suite  [10].  Batch  verification, 
Bloom filter, Bilinear Pairnings
15ms
Message signature verification ECDSA_2048 3ms
Certificate status validation based on 
[9][15]
2 x Tx time RSU OBU plus SHA1↔  
and ECDSA_2048
1+1+3+0.1
= 4.01ms
RC signature verification ECDSA_2048 3ms
Total 26,01ms
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Figure 6. Effect in time of a short CRL renewal period
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Figure 7: Steps security announcement for RC plus status verification
4.2 Fixed validity period RCs
Here we consider a system relying just in the RCs, which are delivered individually to 
each  user.  The  validity  period  for  the  RCs  is  fixed  but  their  delivery  to  all  the 
population is distributed over the period to minimize peaks in the rate.
This  system  is  less  difficult  to  implement,  as  most  of  the  elements  to  produce,  
delivery and handle the identity certificates are already deployed and can be reused 
for the RCs.
Bandwidth cost from TA to the RSUs through the fixed Internet links varies with  
the RC renewal time Figure 8.
To  approximate  the  BW inside  the  RSU cell,  we  follow  the  approach  of  the 
previous section  [15].  With  8  broadcast  areas  inside  each  cell  and  we get  a  BW 
2Mbps.  The  other  exchanges  that  could  affect  in  the  local  BW are  the  vehicles 
behavior reports (very low as explained in the previous case) and the delivery of RC 
plus some secure delivery protocol will still be a low rate, let's say 50 kbps per cell.  
Therefore, we have Bw
cell_RC 2,05Mbps.≃
Regarding the cost of the security operations we can observe it decreased as now it 
is not necessary to check the validity of the users on this reputation. We can say that 
now this is implicit in the existence or not of the RC.
Systems fidelity: Alike the previous case, if LossAVG·T_update>RepAVG there is an 
''impunity  period'  for  some  nodes  (but  Tr  is  considered  fixed  in  this  scenario). 
Nonetheless, when referring to long renewal periods, the values LossAVG and RepAVG 
do not reflect reality. If we use a day renewal, it is more likely that a part of the user s 
will be able to operate in a revoked situation.
There is also a less critical inaccuracy due users offering services out of their real  
reputation band. As a result, the system's accuracy is improved from a fixed validity 
period scheme or even from a homogeneous variable validity period. 
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Table 5. Time cost of the cryptographic operation with sole RC based systems
Security operation Description Time(ms)
IC  revocation  status  checking  and 
signature verification
SPECS  suite  [10].  Batch  verification, 
Bloom filter, Bilinear Pairnings
15ms
Message signature verification ECDSA_2048 3ms
RC signature verification ECDSA_2048 3ms
Total 21ms
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Figure 8. BW from TA to RSU
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Figure 9. Steps security announcement for RC scheme
4.3 Variable validity period RCs
As we commented in  the contribution section,  adapting the validity  period to the 
previous behaviour can improve the system's  quality  and decrease the bandwidth, 
providing users' reputation evolves smoothly. This last supposition may not always be 
true.  Therefore  under  high  load  conditions,  the  system  can  decide  to  issue  less 
frequent RCs. The less harmful criterion would be to issue longer validity periods 
certificates  to  fast  changing  users  in  the  upper  reputation  range  while  discarding 
certificates  in the lower range by not  issuing them frequently nor extending their 
validity period.
To get the bandwidth cost in the fixed links from TA to RSUs, we model a typical 
behaviour of the population,establishing that the certificates validity period varies in 
the range 30 minutes to 4 hours. We suppose that 20% of the moving cars have a fast 
reputation variation, 20% a medium one and 60% are stable one. Giving them 30 
minutes, 2 hours and 4 hours respectability and using Figure 8 we get a BWTA  RSU → = 
650Kbps.
The bandwidth cost inside the cell is composed of two elements. First we calculate 
the cost in the own announcements interchanged among vehicles. We follow the same 
principle  as  in  the  case  of  fixed  validity  period  RCs and subdivide  the  cell  in  8  
announcement emission areas where cars broadcast their messages and certificates. 
That gives us a bandwidth of 2Mbps.
The second element is the cost of delivering certificates from RSU to each of the 
OBUs. RCs delivery has little impact in the BW between RSU and the OBUs. As 
seen, the  validity period changes and consequently, the renewal time. But even in the  
worst case that all the population approximates to the revocation threshold (and have 
the shortest validity period of 30 minutes), it will result in a rate about 1Kbps per cell. 
Therefore the total bandwidth is BW
cell_RC 2Mbps.≃
The time cost due to cryptographic operations in this scenario is the same as in  
fixed RCs.
For the evaluation of the system's fidelity to reputation, as we commented in the 
architecture introduction, the TA improves the system's accuracy  by modulating the 
validity period of the newly issued RC as a function of the recent behaviour of the  
owner.
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Figure 10. Effect in time of variable validity period RC
4.4 Comparison
For comparison aims, we take BWTA   RSU→   in the range of [0,5 to 1] Mbps as 
achievable.  This  rate  shouldn’t  be  an  issue  over  a  quality  HDSL  line.  For  the 
cryptographic time cost , a figure around the 50ms can cope with the fastest response 
services, which use to be the brake announcements.  
From Table 6 we can see that the differences are in the local bandwidth used by the 
different approaches and also in the ability to follow the users' real reputation as well 
as the changes needed to deploy the mechanism
Currently, the DSCR standard allow values up to 4,2Mbps but highly influenced 
by the traffic load and streets configuration. It is expected that in a near future, better 
design and protocols will enable the DSCR to deliver these rates and over [16]
Fixed RC has similar cost than RC plus revocation-status-validation but the former 
is  much simpler  to  deploy  as  the certificates  issuing and processing elements  are 
already present for the IC. However we can see that its quality following the real 
reputation is not optimal.
'Variable RC' improves 'Fixed RC' in following real reputation values but has a 
higher cost in BW (4,4 Mbps), nearly in the limit of DSRC. Possible solutions could 
be:  Smaller  announcement  broadcasting  areas  (difficult  to  implement  discovery 
protocols, interferences), Shorter certificates (currently the Elliptic Curves provides 
the  smallest  possible),  smoother  user's  behavior  (will  need  real  analysis),  less 
announcement  rate  (some  of  the  services  as  brake  announcement  wouldn't  be 
covered).
Table 6. Table for comparison of the different reputation delivery approaches
BWTA  RSU↔ BW cell System's fidelity Deployment
Long life RC +
RC  status validation
627 Kbps 3,64 Mbps High Difficult
Sort life RC 1 Mbps 2,2 Mbps Poor Easy
Variable life RC 650 Kbps 4,6 Mbps Medium Easy
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis we have reviewed the current mechanisms to efficiently introduce the 
concept of reputation in VANETs. We have seen that  this concept turns specially 
relevant as these are vehicular networks where safety is critical but also, because of 
the sporadic users interactions and other factors is difficult to implement a robust and 
distributed reputation model.
The current proposals, based on certificate status validation lists, offers a limited 
scope for reputation management as we only know whether the other end is entrusted 
or not to play a role in the network. We introduced a system based in the principle of 
identity certificates but applied for  the scatter distribution of a centrally generated 
reputation, so that the certificates are delivered to their owners and they redistribute 
them with their service offers. In parallel with this smooth reputation, we proposed a 
gradual response based on  the different levels of trust in the services. This is ruled by 
a decision module which dwells in the cars and also gathers local information from 
sensors.
Our analysis proved that the reputation certificates are simpler a easier to deploy 
than other approaches as the distributed reputation or the revocations lists. Besides, 
compared to the latter it equals or even improves its fidelity tracking the actual user's 
reputation value.
For further works some simulations should be done for fine tuning the system's 
parameters and also a study on the techniques based on decision theory  and their  
application for fast response in the car's decision module.
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Glossary
AP Access Point
CA Certification Authority
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications
HDSL High bit rate Digital Subscriber Line
IC Identity Certificate
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
MANETS Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
OBU On-Board Unit
PPP Pont to Point Protocol
RC Reputation Certificate
RSU Road Side Unit
TA Trusted Authority
TTP Trusted Third Party
VANETS Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Wi-MAx Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
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